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Abstract
This paper uses spatial econometric methods to investigate property-tax competition among
local governments. The theoretical model is drawn from the literature on tax competition, in
which local jurisdictions choose property-tax rates taking into account the migration of mobile
capital in response to tax di®erentials. Using a \spatial lag" econometric model, the paper
estimates the reaction function of the representative community, which relates the community's
property-tax rate to its own characteristics and to the tax rates in competing communities. A
nonzero reaction-function slope indicates the presence of strategic interaction in the choice of
tax rates. The estimation uses cross-section data on property taxes and other socio-economic
variables for cities in the Boston metropolitan area. The results, which are presented for two
periods before and after imposition of Proposition 21
2 (a tax limitation measure), indicate the
presence of strategic interaction.
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1. Introduction
A long line of research in public ¯nance analyzes ¯scal interaction among governments.
Fiscal interaction may be the result of bene¯t spillovers, where residents of one jurisdiction
consume the public goods provided by neighboring jurisdictions. Alternatively, interaction may
arise because of interjurisdictional mobility of the tax base. The early theoretical literature
(Williams (1966), Pauly (1970), Oates (1972), and Boskin (1973)) analyzed interaction due to
spillovers. Subsequent work has focused on interaction due to tax-base mobility, generating
what has become known as the \tax competition" literature. In tax-competition models, ju-
risdictions ¯nance provision of a public good with a tax on locally-employed capital. Capital
is nationally ¯xed but moves among jurisdictions in response to tax-rate di®erentials, while
community populations are typically immobile. In the competitive version of the model, ¯rst
analyzed by Beck (1983), Wilson (1986), and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), jurisdictions are
small relative to the economy and thus are unable to a®ect the net-of-tax return to capital. As
a result, tax rates in other jurisdictions are irrelevant, and strategic behavior is absent. When
individual jurisdictions are large relative to the economy, each jurisdiction is able to alter cap-
ital's net return by varying its tax rate. In this case, which was ¯rst analyzed by Mintz and
Tulkens (1986), Wildasin (1988a), and Bucovetsky (1991), the tax rates in other jurisdictions
must be taken into account in a given jurisdiction's choice, leading to strategic behavior. Re-
gardless of whether jurisdictions behave competitively or strategically, tax-competition models
generate an important conclusion, namely that public goods are underprovided. The reason is
that each community keeps its tax rate low in an attempt to preserve its tax base. See Wilson
(1999) for an up-to-date survey of the literature.1
Despite the widespread theoretical interest in tax competition and other types of ¯scal in-
1teraction, the empirical literature in this area is sparse. The pioneering study is by Case, Rosen
and Hines (1993), who estimate an empirical model of strategic interaction among state govern-
ments in the U.S., viewing expenditures as the strategic variable. Their empirical speci¯cation
is derived from a model of interstate bene¯t spillovers, and the estimation uses an approach
borrowed from the spatial econometrics literature. Besley and Case (1995), Figlio, Kolpin and
Reid (1997), Saavedra (1999), Shroder (1995), Smith (1997) also study ¯scal interaction at the
state level, with the latter four papers focusing on the choice of welfare bene¯ts.
Only two previous studies investigate ¯scal interaction among local governments using ap-
propriate methodologies. Following the econometric approach of Case et al. (1993), Brueckner
(1998) estimates a model of strategic interaction in the choice of growth-control measures by
California cities. Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) study the strategic choice of property taxes
by Belgian municipalities, employing a similar methodology.2 The present paper complements
the Heyndels-Vuchelen study by using city-level data from the U.S. to estimate a model of
strategic property-tax competition. Although Heyndels and Vuchelen motivate their paper as
a study of \tax mimicking" among nearby cities, the intent of the present study is to provide
an indirect empirical test of tax-competition models, recognizing that local property taxes are
the best real-world analog to the capital taxes analyzed in the existing theoretical studies.
The empirical analysis is designed to estimate the property-tax reaction function of a rep-
resentative community. This function relates the community's property tax rate to its own
characteristics and to the tax rates in competing jurisdictions. When tax rates are chosen
strategically, taking account of capital movements among communities, the reaction function
has a nonzero slope, indicating that changes in competitors' tax rates a®ect the given commu-
nity's choice. The theory, however, shows that this slope can be either positive or negative,
with the exact sign depending on parameter values. Alternatively, if strategic interaction is
absent, then the reaction-function slope is identically zero. Thus, the empirical question of
interest is whether the slope parameter is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. In this case, the
absence of strategic interaction can be rejected as a null hypothesis. Despite the focus on
statistical signi¯cance, the sign of the reaction-function slope is important in determining the
comparative-static properties of the Nash equilibrium, as is shown in a simulation exercise
2based on the estimates.
The sample for the empirical work consists of 70 cities from the Boston metropolitan area.
Massachusetts is a convenient empirical setting because cities and school districts are cotermi-
nous, so that a single property-tax rate applies within a city's boundaries, and because property
taxes are the only important local revenue source. The Massachusetts setting is also interest-
ing because it allows the test for strategic interaction to be carried out under two di®erent
property-tax regimes: before and after Proposition 21
2, a property-tax limitation measure that
took e®ect in 1981. A measure designed to limit property taxes should constrain the choices
of local governments, reducing the extent of strategic interaction. This hypothesis is tested by
estimating the model before (in 1980) and after (in 1990) the imposition of Proposition 21
2.
Following earlier work, the econometric speci¯cation uses a spatial lag model. In such
a model, a weight matrix aggregates the property-tax rates in competing communities into
a single variable that appears on the right-hand side of the reaction function. Community
characteristics also appear as explanatory variables, and their e®ect is to shift the intercept of
the reaction function. The reduced form of this model is estimated via maximum likelihood
techniques.
To motivate the empirical work, section 2 develops a theoretical model, which represents
an adaptation of the standard tax-competition framework to our empirical setting. Section 3
develops the empirical model and describes the data. Sections 4 and 5 present the empirical
results for 1980 and 1990, respectively. Section 6 describes the results of the simulation exercise,
and Section 7 o®ers conclusions.
2. A Model of Property-Tax Competition
2.1. Overview
To understand our modeling approach, it is useful to review the evolution of research on
the e®ects of competition among local governments. Starting with Tiebout (1956), a long line
of research has shown that intergovernmental competition bene¯ts consumers by generating
a variety of public-good choices within a metropolitan area. This variety, which emerges as
local governments compete to attract residents, leads to an equilibrium in which consumers
3e±ciently self-select into di®erent communities according to their demand for public goods.
In contrast, the tax-competition literature has explored the \bad" side of intergovernmental
competition, showing that each community sets its tax rate too low in an attempt to preserve
its tax base.
Our view is that a realistic model of property-tax determination requires a blend of the
Tiebout and tax-competition traditions. In such a model, consumers are mobile and self-select
into homogeneous communities, which rely on property taxes to ¯nance public goods. Since
concern about capital °ight leads to low tax rates, the equilibrium has e±cient sorting of
consumers across communities, but it exhibits a tendency toward underprovision of public
goods.
To incorporate this view, we present a model where the standard assumption of homo-
geneous preferences, which characterizes all previous tax-competition models, is replaced by
preference heterogeneity. Consumers, who consists of several discrete types, are assumed to
sort into homogeneous communities according to their demand for public goods. Once sorted,
the residents choose property taxes in the usual way, taking account of the depressing e®ect of
the tax rate on the community's tax base. Because the number of communities is small, tax
rates are chosen in strategic fashion. The resulting framework can be referred to as a strategic
\Tiebout/tax-competition model."3
As shown below, this model generates property-tax reaction functions in the usual way.
However, the model carries important implications regarding the appropriate econometric
methodology for estimating such functions. To see the issue, recall that community char-
acteristics appear as shift variables on the right hand side of the estimated function. Although
these characteristics are ultimately endogenous in a world of Tiebout sorting, our model implies
that they may be treated as predetermined in analyzing the choice of tax rates. The reason
is that consumers are assumed to sort initially, and then to choose property tax rates condi-
tional on the achieved sorting. Given that each of the distinct consumer types (e.g., high, low,
middle demanders) strictly prefers his own community, small variations in tax rates will not
generate population movements. This in turn allows community characteristics to be treated
as exogenous in estimating the reaction function. In the main part of their study, Heyndels
4and Vuchelen (1998) take this same approach.
A di®erent conclusion would emerge in a model with a continuum of consumers di®eren-
tiated by income, as in Epple and Romer (1991). In this case, communities are continuously
strati¯ed by income, and reaction functions again determine a Nash equilibrium in tax rates.
Although such a model would generate an empirical framework nearly indistinguishable from
the one used in this paper, community characteristics and tax rates would be jointly deter-
mined, requiring characteristics to be viewed as endogenous. The reason is that consumers
at the strati¯cation boundaries would be indi®erent between communities, so that tax-rate
changes would lead to population movements and resulting changes in average community
incomes. Finding instruments to correct for the resulting endogeneity of community char-
acteristics would be a formidable challenge. However, such a correction is unneeded if the
empirical reality more closely resembles the one sketched above, where a discrete number of
consumer types separate into homogeneous communities.
Another modeling issue concerns the proper assumption on the supply of capital to the
regional economy, in our case the Boston metropolitan area. It could be argued that capital is
supplied in perfectly-elastic fashion by the national market, making the competitive version of
the tax-competition model appropriate and ruling out strategic interaction among Boston-area
communities. However, there are reasons to think that capital supply is less than perfectly
elastic, lending plausibility to the alternative assumption of a ¯xed stock of capital in the
metropolitan area. First, the Boston area is well known as an incubator for high-technology
industries, which suggests that investment in such industries is strongly tied to the area. In
addition, other types of capital oriented toward serving the local population may be ¯xed in
supply to the region. For example, the capital embodied in a given community's shopping
centers, grocery stores, and other retail establishments may not leave the metropolitan area in
response to an increase in the local property-tax rate, as a model with perfectly-elastic supply
would predict. Instead, such capital may relocate to a nearby community within the area, so
as to remain close to a targeted customer base. For both these reasons, the assumption of a
¯xed supply of capital is plausible, justifying its use in the analysis.
52.2. The model
To begin developing the model, suppose for simplicity that the metropolitan area contains
just two communities, and let Ki denote the capital invested in community i, i = 1;2. This
capital is combined with a local ¯xed factor Pi to produce a numeraire private good according to
a constant-returns technology. The production function is given by F(Ki;Pi), and its intensive
form is written f(ki), where ki is capital per unit of the ¯xed factor. This factor is most
conveniently viewed as the labor supplied by local workers, so that Pi represents community
i's population and ki is capital per worker. However, this assumption may be unrealistic since
it implies that each community in the metropolitan area constitutes a separate labor market.
Alternatively, Pi could be viewed as the ¯xed land area devoted to private-good production,
which would be owned by the local residents. For concreteness, the ensuing discussion adopts
the labor interpretation of the ¯xed factor.
Property taxes are levied on the capital invested in each community, with ti denoting the
tax per unit of capital in community i. The net-of-tax return then equals capital's marginal
product less the tax, or f0(ki)¡ti. Since capital is mobile, net returns must be equalized across
communities, so that
f0(k1) ¡ t1 = f0(k2) ¡ t2 = ½; (1)
where ½ is the uniform net return. Given that the metropolitan area's capital stock is ¯xed at
K, the additional condition
P1k1 + P2k2 = K (2)
must also hold. Together, (1) and (2) determine k1, k2, and ½ as functions of t1 and t2. It is
easily shown that @ki=@ti < 0 holds for i = 1;2, indicating that higher taxes shrink community
i's tax base as capital relocates to equalize net returns. The derivative @½=@ti is also negative,
indicating that capital's net return is reduced by higher taxes.
For realism, the property tax is also levied on housing. To simplify the analysis, we
assume that housing is produced using only land, with the capital input ignored. In addition,
the quantity of residential land in the community, denoted Li, is ¯xed, which means housing
supply is perfectly inelastic. By appropriate choice of units of measurement for land, the tax
6per unit can be set equal to ti, the rate on capital. Land's net-of-tax return is denoted ri, so
that its gross price is then ri + ti.
The residents of each community are assumed to be owner-occupiers, owning equal shares
of the residential land. The land endowment per capita in community i is q¤
i ´ Li=Pi. Also, as
in the standard tax-competition model, ownership of the metropolitan area's capital stock is
divided equally among all consumers, with individual endowments given by k¤ ´ K=(P1+P2).
As explained above, we assume that the sorting process generates communities with ho-
mogeneous preferences. Accordingly, let Ui(xi;qi;zi) denote the common utility function for
residents of community i, where xi is private-good consumption, qi is housing consumption,
and zi is consumption of a public good. Consumer income is the sum of the following compo-
nents: the return to the ¯xed factor, wi = f(ki)¡kif0(ki), which is interpreted as wage income;
the return to the capital endowment, ½k¤; and the return to the residential land endowment,
riq¤
i . Since consumers, as owner-occupiers, can be viewed as renting land from themselves, the
budget constraint for a resident of community i is then
xi = wi + ½k¤ + (ri ¡ ti)q¤
i ¡ riqi: (3)
In addition, assuming that the public good is a private good with a unit cost of one, the
government's budget constraint is
zi = ti(q¤
i + ki); (4)
where the second expression is property-tax revenue per capita.
Because of ¯xed land supply and the absence of housing capital, the residential portion of
the property tax functions as a lump-sum tax, so that the model ultimately behaves just like a
standard tax-competition model. This follows because clearing of the housing market requires
land consumption to equal the per capita endowment, so that qi = q¤
i . While adjustment of ri
ensures that this equality is satis¯ed, the net return then drops out of the budget constraint,
with the last two terms in (3) reducing to ¡tiq¤
i , a lump-sum tax. Substituting for wi in (3),
7and using (4), utility can then be written
Ui[f(ki) ¡ kif0(ki) + ½k¤ ¡ tiq¤
i ; q¤
i ; ti(q¤
i + ki)] (5)
The residents of community choose ti to maximize (5), taking into account the e®ects of the
tax rate on ki and ½. In addition, the tax rate in the other community is viewed as parametric.













where the terms on the left are marginal utilities. The standard e±ciency result in the literature
can be seen by evaluating (6) in the symmetric case, where consumers have identical preferences
and where community populations and residential land areas are equal. In this case, t1 = t2
must hold in the Nash equilibrium, implying k1 = k2 = k¤. The right-hand side of (6) then
reduces to (k¤+q¤)=[k¤+q¤+ti(@ki=@ti)] > 1, where q¤ is the common land endowment (recall
@ki=@ti < 0). Since the marginal rate of transformation between the private and public goods
is unitary, this inequality implies that z is underprovided.4 Note that (6) is identical to the
standard formula in the literature when q¤ is set equal to zero.
Suppose now that population and land-area symmetry is preserved, but that residents of
community 1 are high demanders of the public good, with low demanders living in community
2. In this case, the equilibrium is asymmetric, and it is determined by the joint solution of (6)
for i = 1;2, where di®erent marginal rates of substitution appear on the left-hand sides. To
see how the asymmetry arises, start at a symmetric low-demand equilibrium, and observe that
the high demanders have an incentive to raise t1 in order to spend more on the public good,
viewing t2 as parametric. Capital moves from community 1 to 2 in response, but tax revenue
rises initially in community 1 because of the higher tax rate, satisfying the stronger demand
for z. In the resulting Nash equilibrium, t1 > t2 holds, implying k1 < k2. This result can
be proved formally by adapting the approach of Wilson (1991), who analyzes the asymmetry
caused by intercommunity di®erences in factor endowments.
8This discussion suggests that in a strategic Tiebout/tax-competition model, high-demand
communities have high property-tax rates and low capital stocks, while the reverse is true in
low-demand communities. Thus, high-demand communities end up driving away business in-
vestment in pursuit of a high level of public spending. Brueckner (1999) establishes that the
same conclusion holds in a Tiebout/tax-competition model based on competitive, rather than
strategic, behavior.
2.3. Reaction functions
The tax rates t1 and t2 that emerge in the Nash equilibrium are located at the intersection
of the reaction functions for communities 1 and 2. To see the origin of these functions, let
i = 1 in (6), and note that since k1 depends on t1 and t2, the equation implicitly determines
t1 as a function of t2, yielding community 1's reaction function. Community 2's function is
found similarly.
Because estimation of reaction functions is the goal of the empirical work, it is useful to
derive these functions for a special case. This example also illustrates an important point
mentioned in the introduction, namely that reaction functions can either slope up or down.
First, suppose that f is quadratic, with f(ki) = ¯ki ¡ °k2
i=2, where ¯;° > 0. In addition,
suppose that preferences are linear, with Ui(xi;qi;zi) = xi+¿iqi+´izi, where ¿i;´i > 0. Then,
(1) and (2) yield k1 = k¤ + (t2 ¡ t1)=2°, so that @k1=@t1 = ¡1=2°. Substituting these results
in (6) for i = 1, and substituting ´1 on the left-hand side, the equation can be solved to yield
community 1's reaction function. The function is linear and is written
t1 =
4°(1 ¡ ´1)(k¤ + q¤) + (1 ¡ 2´1)t2
1 ¡ 4´1
: (7)
Since the second-order condition for the maximization problem requires 1 ¡ 4´1 < 0 or ´1 >
1=4, the denominator of (7) is negative. Therefore, reaction function's slope, which equals
(1 ¡ 2´1)=(1 ¡ 4´1), negative when 1=4 < ´1 < 1=2 and positive when ´1 > 1=2. Thus,
community 1 lowers (raises) its tax rate in response to an increase in t2 when the marginal
utility of the public good is small (large). Community 2's reaction function is generated by
interchanging the 1 and 2 subscripts in (7), and the intersection between this function and (7)
9gives the Nash equilibrium. Figure 1 shows an equilibrium for the case where both reaction
functions are upward sloping (the dotted line is discussed below).
If both preferences and populations di®er across communities, (7) is replaced by
t1 =
°(1 ¡ ´1)(k¤ + q¤)=s2
1 + (1 ¡ ´1=s1)t2
1 ¡ 2´1=s1
; (8)
where s1 = P2=(P1 + P2) equals the share of the metropolitan population living outside of
community 1. The slope of the reaction function in (8) may again be positive or negative,
depending on the magnitude of ´1 in relation to s1. Generally, (8) shows that the position of
the reaction function depends on community preferences and on the distribution of population
within the metropolitan area, a dependence that will also hold in general.
This discussion shows that, with the exception of the knife-edge case where ´1 = s1,
the reaction function slope in (8) is nonzero. As a result, the proper empirical test for the
existence of strategic property-tax competition is a simple signi¯cance test on the estimated
slope parameter. If the empirical results show that the slope is signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero, then the evidence is consistent with strategic behavior. Otherwise, the reaction function
is °at, indicating the absence of strategic interaction in property-tax choices.
A ¯nal observation is that the key features of the Tiebout/tax-competition equilibrium
are veri¯ed in the present special case. In particular, it can be shown that in any stable Nash
equilibrium with equal populations, a community's tax rate depends on the strength of its
demand for public goods, with t1 > (<)t2 holding as ´1 > (<)´2. Thus, the high-demand
community has a high tax rate and a low capital stock.
3. The Empirical Model
3.1. General speci¯cation
The property-tax reaction function given by (8) is the starting point for speci¯cation of the
empirical model. This equation implies that community i's property-tax rate depends on tax
rates in other communities, on its own preferences, and on the distribution of the metropolitan




!ijtj + Ziµ + ²i: (9)
In (9), the !ij; j 6= i, represent a set of weights that aggregate the tax rates in other com-
munities into a single variable, which has a scalar coe±cient Á. Zi is a vector containing the
socio-economic characteristics of community i, which represent preferences and other factors
a®ecting the demand for public goods (µ is the corresponding coe±cient vector). The error
term is ²i, and it is assumed to be normally distributed with constant variance and to be
independent across observations. Note that (9) may be viewed as a linear approximation to a
more general nonlinear reaction function.
It is important to note that the weights in (13) are speci¯ed arbitrarily, and that a common
slope parameter Á applies to the (weighted) tax rate in each competing community. More
°exible speci¯cations would be impossible to estimate. Although the weights are arbitrary, a
variety of weighting schemes may be explored to allow di®erent patterns of spatial interaction,
as explained further below.
Repeating (9) for each community in the metropolitan area, the equation can be rewritten
in matrix form as
t = ÁWt + Zµ + ²; (10)
where t is the vector of property-tax rates, Z is the matrix of socio-economic characteristics,
and ² is the error vector. Note that the diagonal elements of the weight matrix W are zero
and that a representative o®-diagonal element is !ij. In the econometrics literature, a model
such as (10) is known as a spatial autoregressive, or spatial lag, model. In the present context,
the \lag" parameter Á gives the slope of the reaction function.
The theoretical model implies that property-tax rates are jointly determined in a Nash
equilibrium, and this simultaneity means that that the vector Wt on the right-hand side of
(10) is endogenous. Because of its endogeneity, Wt is correlated with the error vector ²,
implying that ordinary least squares estimates of the parameters of (10) are inconsistent. This
11problem can be circumvented, however, by solving for the reduced form of (10). Assuming
that I ¡ ÁW is invertible, the reduced form is
t = (I ¡ ÁW)¡1Zµ + (I ¡ ÁW)¡1²: (11)
With simultaneity removed, (11) can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques.5
Recall that in this estimation, the community-characteristics variables in Zi are treated as
exogenous, as explained above.
As noted earlier, the variance-covariance matrix of the error vector ² is assumed to be
proportional to the identity matrix, indicating that errors are independent across communities.
Suppose this assumption is violated and that the errors instead exhibit spatial dependence,
satisfying the relationship
² = ¸W² + v; (12)
where v is a well-behaved normal error vector. Such spatial dependence can arise when ²
includes omitted variables not captured in Z, which are themselves spatially dependent. If
spatial error dependence is ignored, estimation of (11) may yield a misleading estimate of
the reaction-function slope Á. For example, suppose that the true value of Á is zero but the
errors are positively correlated across nearby communities. In this case, the true model is
the \spatial error" model, which consists of t = Zµ + ² and (12), with ¸ > 0. Then, when
(11) is the estimated using a distance-based W, the Á estimate is likely to be positive and
signi¯cant, indicating that tax rates in nearby cities move together. Thus, uncorrected error
dependence can give a false impression of strategic interaction when none in fact is occurring.
Moreover, once the spatial lag model is estimated, a test for spatial error dependence may
show its absence. The e®ects of error dependence may therefore be \hidden" in a spurious
spatial lag parameter.
Several approaches exist for dealing with this problem. One is to estimate an expanded
model consisting of (10) and (12), as is done by Case et al. (1993). However, reliable estimation
of the separate parameters Á and ¸, which perform similar roles in the model, may be di±cult
(see Anselin (1988), Anselin and Bera (1996), and Anselin, Bera, Florax and Yoon (1996)).
12Another approach is to separately test the hypotheses Á = 0 and ¸ = 0 using the robust
Lagrange multiplier tests developed by Anselin et al. (1996). In the case of Á, the usual LM
test would evaluate the increase in the likelihood function as Á diverges from zero, rejecting
the hypothesis Á = 0 when the increase is su±ciently large. The problem is that, with non-
separability of the likelihood function, the distribution of the resulting test statistic depends
on the value of ¸, so that the test is invalid if the assumed value of ¸ (e.g., zero) is incorrect.
This problem is solved by adjusting the test statistic to account for the in°uence of ¸, an
adjustment that does not require knowledge of its true value. The same procedure can be used
to construct a robust test of ¸ = 0. Note that since both tests rely on estimates for the case
Á = ¸ = 0, they can be carried out using the results of an OLS regression.
A third approach is to test the \common factor hypothesis," which must hold if the spatial
error model is correct. Rejection of this hypothesis again suggests that evidence of strategic
interaction is not spurious.6 The latter two approaches are pursued below, and additional
diagnostic tests are carried out.
3.2. Speci¯cation of the Weight Matrix
Given that the weight matrix in (11) aggregates the tax rates of competing communities,
its speci¯cation implicitly imposes a certain pattern of interaction. Our weighting schemes
take into account the distances from a given community to its competitors, as well as the
population sizes of the competitors.
Weights that vary inversely with distance are used to account for the possibility that
capital is imperfectly mobile across communities within the metropolitan area. For example,
because high-tech ¯rms value proximity to similar businesses, a community attempting to add
to an existing high-tech concentration will focus on tax rates in nearby communities, which
constitute the relevant competition. The ¯rst of two distance-based weighting schemes is a
simple contiguity scheme, which assigns a weight of one to cities within the Boston metropolitan
area that share a border with the given city, and a weight of zero to other cities. The resulting
weight matrix is denoted Wcont. The second scheme imposes a smooth distance decay, with
weights given by !ij = 1=dij for j 6= i, where dij is the distance between cities i and j (the
resulting weight matrix is denoted Wd).7 Note that while Wcont generates a simple sum of
13tax rates for the subset of cities that are adjacent to i, Wd aggregates the tax rates of all cities
in the metropolitan area, using weights that are inversely related to their distance from i. By
convention, each weight matrix is row-normalized prior to estimation, so that the aggregation
of competing tax rates actually takes the form of a weighted average.
Since the reaction-function slope in (8) depends on the distribution of population in the
metropolitan area, population-based weighting schemes are also appropriate. The ¯rst weight-
ing scheme gives competing city j a weight equal to its population Pj, without regard to
distance. The resulting weight matrix, whose representative element is !ij = Pj, for j 6= i, is
denoted WP. Two additional schemes blend population and distance in generating weights,
with the ¯rst assigning weight Pj to cities j that are contiguous to city i and a weight of zero to
noncontiguous cities (the weight matrix is denoted WPcont). The second scheme de°ates the
competing city's population by the smooth distance decay, with weights given by !ij = Pj=dij
for j 6= i (the weight matrix is WP=d). As in the pure distance schemes, the latter weight
matrices are row-normalized.
3.3. Data and Socio-Economic Characteristics
We use two cross-section samples, which cover 70 cities in the Boston metropolitan area
(see Table 5 below for a list). The ¯rst sample is for 1980, the year before Proposition 21
2
became e®ective. The second sample is for 1990, a year by which the e®ects of Proposition
21
2 were well established. To compute the e®ective property-tax rate prevailing in each city
in 1980, the city's nominal tax rate is multiplied by the ratio of total assessed property value
to total market value.8 Since Massachusetts shifted to full-value assessment after Proposition
21
2, the nominal tax rates for 1990 are the e®ective rates, so that they can be used directly.
It is important to note that, given the coterminous arrangement of school districts and cities,
the property-tax rates for both years cover education as well as municipal spending.
The socio-economic variables used in the regressions are per capita income, per capita
state aid, the African-American proportion of the population, the proportion of the adult
population with at least a college education, public sector earnings per capita, and the annual
rate of population growth.9 Since the per capita property-tax base rises with income in our
sample, we expect that high-income cities can satisfy their residents' high public-good demands
14with relatively low tax rates, conditional on the tax rates in other communities.10 Similarly,
since a high level of state aid increases the resources available to a city, this should allow a
reduction in its tax rate. The African-American population share is included in part because
it measures poverty, but also because it may capture any di®erential public service needs of a
minority population.11 Since the demand for school spending is likely to be high in cities with
many college-educated residents, we expect relatively high tax rates in such cities, holding tax
rates in other communities ¯xed.
A public-sector earnings variable is included to control for the cost of public good provision,
with the expectation that cities with high labor costs will have high tax rates. Because of
missing observations on public-sector employment made it impossible to compute a variable
giving earnings per employee, we divide total public-sector wages and salaries by the city's
population. The resulting variable partly captures the e®ect of high wages, but it will also
be large when public employment per capita is large. While this raises the possibility of
endogeneity, we retained this variable because of a desire to include a cost measure in the
estimating equation.12
To capture growth e®ects, the city's annual rate of population growth is computed over
the previous decade for the two sample years (over 1970-80 for the 1980 sample, and 1980-90
for the 1990 sample). Fast-growing cities tend to be relatively young, and although they face
substantial demands for new infrastructure, they bene¯t from burgeoning tax bases and are
free of many of the spending demands faced by older, established cities. If the latter e®ects
dominate, then tax rates will tend to be lower in fast-growing cities.13 Because the growth
rate is measured over the previous decade, the possibility of simultaneous determination of
growth and the tax rate is lessened.
Recall from above that the intercept of the reaction function depends (along with the
slope) on the distribution of the metropolitan population. This suggests that the city's own
population can be included in the Z matrix in (10) as one of the variables shifting the reaction-
function intercept. However, when population appears in the estimating equation along with
the above variables, the regression diagnostics are unsatisfactory, with the residuals indicating
nonnormal errors for three of the ¯ve weighting schemes. As a result, only the variables
15discussed above are included in the main speci¯cation presented in the next section. Additional
results are given for an equation including population, using the two weighting schemes where
the diagnostics are acceptable.
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for the variables in the empirical model. In
the estimation, all variables except for the population growth rate are expressed in natural-log
form.
4. Estimation Results for 1980
The model (10) is estimated using the ¯ve di®erent weighting schemes discussed in Section
3.2. Table 2 reports the coe±cient estimates and their corresponding asymptotic standard
normal statistics (z-values, in parenthesis). In addition, the Table shows the values of the
various test statistics and their corresponding probability values (p-values, in parenthesis).
The most important results in Table 2 are the estimates of Á, the reaction-function slope
parameter. To start, consider the results in the ¯rst ¯ve columns of the Table, which pertain to
the speci¯cation without the population variable. Table 2 reveals that under this speci¯cation,
the estimated slope coe±cient is positive and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero under four of
the ¯ve weighting schemes. While Á is not signi¯cant in the speci¯cation with weight matrix
WP, evidence of strategic interaction emerges under schemes where the weights re°ect distance
between competing communities or a combination of distance and population.14 These results
suggest that strategic property-tax competition occurred in the Boston metropolitan area in
1980, and that the interaction generated an upward-sloping reaction function. This means that
community i's best response to an increase in the property-tax rates of competing communities
was to increase its own tax rate. In game-theoretic language, our ¯ndings indicate that the
tax rates of competing communities are \strategic complements." In their study of Belgian
municipalities, Heyndels and Vuchulen (1998) reached the same conclusion.
The middle of Table 2 contains the results for the normality and heteroscedasticity tests.
To check the normality assumption on the error term ² in (10), we report the Kiefer-Salmon
test, whose values indicate that the hypothesis of normal errors cannot be rejected under any of
the weighting schemes. We also report the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity, which has
16good performance under the assumption of normal errors. The value of this statistic indicates
that the hypothesis of constant error variance cannot be rejected for any of the estimated
models at the chosen con¯dence level.
As noted above, the slope parameter Á may appear to be statistically di®erent from zero
when Á = 0 holds in the true model but the errors are spatially dependent. To avoid attributing
a spurious signi¯cance to the slope parameter, we ¯rst perform a robust Lagrange multiplier test
of the hypothesis Á = 0, which is valid in the presence of uncorrected spatial error dependence,
as explained above. The test results are consistent with the ¯ndings reported above, with the
slope parameter Á signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 5 percent level under all speci¯cations.
To determine whether spatial error dependence has been improperly ignored, consider ¯rst
the conditional test for spatial dependence, which is computed using the estimates of the
spatial lag model (recall this test may be misleading). This test, which is shown along with
the other tests of error speci¯cation in Table 2, shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of independent errors in each case. The robust test, which is based on OLS results and does
not su®er from the potential bias of the conditional test, generates similar results. Finally, we
can reject the common factor hypothesis for all four of the distance-based weighting schemes,
indicating that the spatial error model is not appropriate for any of these speci¯cations.
Taken together, these tests suggest that our ¯nding of a nonzero Á is not a spurious result
due to uncorrected spatial error dependence. The tests thus give additional support to our
conclusion that strategic property-tax competition occurred among local governments in the
Boston metropolitan area prior to the imposition of Proposition 21
2.
Turning to the e®ects of the socio-economic characteristics, observe that all of the coe±-
cients are statistically di®erent from zero, and that their estimated values are similar across
the di®erent weighting schemes. The negative coe±cient on per capita income indicates that
the higher per capita tax bases in well-o® cities allow public spending demands to be satis-
¯ed with lower tax rates. The positive e®ect of the education variable appears to re°ect the
strong demand for school spending in highly-educated cities, which leads to higher tax rates.
The negative coe±cient on population growth indicates that the bene¯cial e®ect of growth on
the tax base outstrips its e®ect on spending needs, permitting lower tax rates. The positive
17public-sector earnings coe±cient suggests that tax rates are high in cities where public-sector
wages are high, a response to higher cost of public-good provision. Recall, however, that a
large value for this variable may simply indicate high public employment per capita in the city,
making the cost interpretation incorrect.
Cities where the African-American population share is high also have high tax rates. Rec-
ognizing that African-American incomes are low on average, it is likely that this ¯nding simply
recon¯rms the inverse relationship between tax rates and income found above. Alternatively,
the positive coe±cient may re°ect di®erential public spending needs associated with a large
minority population.15
State aid per capita, the last socio-economic variable, has a signi¯cantly positive coe±-
cient. Since intuition suggests that higher state aid should allow a reduction in taxes, this
result is unexpected. The apparent explanation is that state aid serves as a proxy for other
city characteristics. For example, state-aid formulas typically generate an inverse correlation
between aid and the per capita tax base, which is in turn increasing in income. Therefore,
high state aid may signal low income, which is in turn associated with high tax rates given the
above results.16
Consider ¯nally the last two columns of Table 2, which report results for the speci¯ca-
tion that includes the city's population along with the above variables. As noted earlier, the
diagnostics for this equation were acceptable only under two of the weighting schemes, both
of which involve contiguity. Under both contiguity schemes, the Á estimate is positive and
signi¯cant, as before. In addition, the coe±cients of income, state aid, and the black pop-
ulation proportion retain their former signs and signi¯cance. While the variables measuring
education, population growth, and public sector earnings no longer have signi¯cant coe±cients,
the coe±cient of the new variable, population, is positive and strongly signi¯cant under the
simple contiguity scheme.17 Population has no e®ect on the tax rate, however, under the
population-weighted contiguity scheme.18 Since Table 2 shows that the various tests yield the
same favorable results as in the previous cases, the modi¯ed speci¯cation supports the earlier
conclusion that strategic interaction occurred among Boston-area cities in 1980.19
185. Estimation Results for 1990
This section reports estimation results for the period after the passage of Proposition 21
2,
focusing on the year 1990. Proposition 21
2, which was designed to limit the property-tax
burden in Massachusetts, initially restricted the total property-tax revenue (the tax \levy")
in each city to be less than 2.5 percent of the total market value of property. Any city whose
tax levy initially exceeded this limit was required to reduce its levy by 15 percent per year
until the restriction was met. According to Bradbury (1988), roughly half of Massachusetts
municipalities were required to make this adjustment, and all but two had reduced their levies
by the required amount by 1984. Thereafter, the yearly increase in the tax levy was restricted.
The absolute increase could not exceed 2.5 percent of the previous year's levy plus any gains
from new construction.20 Adding this increment to the previous levy generates a ceiling known
as the \levy limit," which moved upward over time.
Given the boom in Massachusetts real estate markets in the 1980s, which pushed property
values up by more than 2.5 percent per year, the restriction on tax-levy growth guaranteed a
decline in tax rates over time (driving them below 2.5 percent on average by 1990, as seen in
Table 1). This decline occurred eventually even in cities where initial cuts in the levy were
not required, as the rate-of-increase restriction on the levy became binding.21 In addition to
these e®ects on overall tax rates, Proposition 21
2 also led to replacement of the old uniform tax
system, where all property was taxed at the same nominal rate, with a classi¯ed tax system,
where business and residential rates could di®er.
If all cities were constrained by Proposition 21
2, each tax rate would simply equal the
levy limit divided by total property value. With taxes thus constrained, the choice problem
described in Section 2, which presumes interior solutions, would no longer be relevant. As
a result, we might expect that evidence of strategic behavior, present in 1980, would have
disappeared by 1990. Given that almost 300 of Massachusetts' 351 municipalities were taxing
at their levy limits in 1990 (see Bradbury (1991)), it would appear that little scope for strategic
behavior existed in that year.22
To test this hypothesis, we repeat the estimation of Section 4, with several changes. First,
the public sector earnings variable, which is not available in 1990 for cities with populations
19under 25,000, is dropped. In addition, a variable equal to the city's 1989 tax levy, which
determines 1990's levy limit, is added to the equation (this variable is expressed in per capita
terms). With most cities constrained by the levy limit, the coe±cient on this variable should
be positive.
The ¯rst speci¯cation uses the average property-tax rate for each city, which is computed
by taking a weighted average of the residential and business rates, with the weights given by
the relevant shares of total property value. This calculation obscures the di®erential taxation
of residential and business property, but it provides results comparable to those in Table
2. Table 3 shows the estimated coe±cients under the previous weighting schemes for this
modi¯ed speci¯cation (population is not included). The striking feature of the Table is that
none of the Á estimates is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, indicating the absence of strategic
interaction. In addition, the coe±cient on the lagged per capita levy is positive and strongly
signi¯cant, showing the e®ect of the tax-revenue constraint. Consistent with the presence of
such a constraint, the impact of city characteristics on property-tax choices is muted. Only
the coe±cients on per capita income and state aid retain their previous sign¯cance.
If the estimation is repeated using the residential property-tax rate instead of the average
rate, the results are similar, with the Á estimates insigni¯cant. When the business tax rate is
used, however, evidence of strategic interaction reemerges. Table 4 shows that the Á estimates
are positive and signi¯cant in this case under both of the contiguity weighting schemes, and
that the lagged-levy coe±cient is positive and strongly signi¯cant in all cases. In addition, per
capita income and the black population proportion retain their former e®ects.23 The same
conclusion holds in the speci¯cation that includes population, which is shown in the third and
fourth columns of Table 4. The coe±cients on income and the lagged levy remain signi¯cant
in these equations, but population is the only other variable with a nonzero e®ect.
These results suggest that even though the phenomenon is more elusive than before, strate-
gic interaction apparently still occurs in the post-Proposition 21
2 environment in the choice of
business property taxes. As Table 4 shows, however, the interaction appears to be spatially
limited, occurring only among contiguous cities. These ¯ndings are plausible given that Propo-
sition 21
2 limited the tax levy without placing strong restrictions on the mix of revenue from
20business and residential sources.24 As a result, communities had freedom to adjust their busi-
ness and residential tax rates separately, as long as the levy limit was not violated. The results
show that, in choosing its business tax rate, a city responds to the level of business taxes in
nearby communities.
6. A Simulation Exercise
As explained above, the tax rate for any given city in a Nash equilibrium depends on the
characteristics of all the cities in the metropolitan area. This fact, which is a key implication
of strategic interaction, can be illustrated via a simulation exercise based on the 1980 results.
In particular, suppose that per capita income rises in a given city. Since the coe±cient of the
income variable is negative in Table 2, it follows that the reaction function for that city shifts
down, as shown in Figure 1 for the two-city case. As can be seen, the shift in city 1's reaction
function leads to a decline in the tax rates in both cities. This e®ect also emerges in a model
with many cities, and numerical magnitudes can be illustrated using the model's estimated
coe±cients.
To see this, suppose per capita income for the city of Cambridge increases by 25 percent.25
In addition, suppose that interactions are described by the weight matrix Wd, which uses the
smooth distance decay without adjustment for population. Referring to (11), the vector of
tax-rate changes for all the sample cities is given by
(I ¡ ^ ÁWd)¡1(Z1 ¡ Z0)^ µ = (I ¡ ^ ÁWd)¡1(INC1 ¡ INC0)^ µINC; (13)
where Z0 and Z1 are the Z matrices before and after the income change, INC0 and INC1 are
the column vectors of incomes before and after the change, and ^ µINC is the estimated income
coe±cient. Under the given scenario, all elements of the vector INC1 ¡INC0 are zero except
for the Cambridge element.
The results of the calculation based on (13) are shown in Table 5. Naturally, the largest
tax-rate decline occurs in Cambridge, whose rate falls by 1.3 percentage points. Taxes also
decline appreciably in the neighboring cities of Boston, Chelsea, Somerville, and Medford. Tax
rates in other cities, however, decline by smaller amounts. These numbers show that, with
21strategic interaction, a change in the characteristics of a single city generates a cascade of tax-
rate changes throughout the metropolitan area. This interdependence is an important feature
of models of strategic tax competition.
7. Conclusion
This paper has provided empirical evidence on property-tax competition among local gov-
ernments. Reaction functions have been estimated using the techniques of spatial econometrics,
with a nonzero slope coe±cient providing evidence of strategic interaction in the choice of tax
rates. The 1980 results yield slope estimates that are positive and signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero, suggesting that strategic tax competition occurred in the Boston metropolitan area in
the pre-tax-limitation era. Interestingly, the evidence shows that tax competition persisted,
although in a less pervasive manner, after Proposition 21
2 despite the restrictions imposed by
this tax limitation measure.
Although the strategic Tiebout/tax-competition model sketched in Section 2 was used to
motivate the empirical work, it is important to ask whether other models would generate a
similar empirical framework. Models of \yardstick" competition, as exempli¯ed by Besley
and Case (1995), in fact may be observationally equivalent to the current model. In a local-
government version of the Besley-Case framework, consumers would look at tax rates in other
communities to help judge whether their local government is wasting tax revenue and deserves
to be voted out of o±ce. Since self-interested government o±cials choose tax rates knowing
that consumers make such comparisons, strategic interaction among communities arises, as in
a tax-competition model.
While our results are consistent with the tax-competition model, the results cannot prove
that the model is correct as a description of how property-tax rates are chosen. However,
the voluminous tax-competition literature shows that tax-base °ight is widely thought to be a
concern when jurisdictions set tax rates, and thus an important source of strategic interaction
among them. Our use of the tax-competition model in motivating the empirical work re-
°ects this theoretical orientation. Other models (including the yardstick framework) may have




Mean S.Dev. Mean S.Dev.
E®ective Total Prop. Tax Rate 4.44 1.50 1.15 0.15
E®ective Business Prop. Tax Rate | | 1.49 0.43
Per Capita Income 8793 2162 21278 6231
Per Capita State Aid 167.5 52.1 308.1 146.2
Popu. Prop. with 16 + Yr. Educ. 0.162 0.09 0.239 0.107
Annual Rate of Popu. Growth 0.008 1.09 0.078 0.52
Popu. Prop. Afro-American 0.015 0.03 0.024 0.038
Per Capita Pub. Sec. Earnings 546.72 130.0 | |
Lagged Per Capita Levy1 | | 851.4 249.8
Population 38682 67109 38843 68313




Ln E®. Prop. Tax Rt., 1980 (t) Coe±cient Estimates1
Explanatory Variables: Wcont Wd WP WPcont WP=d Wcont WPcont
Wt 0.30 0.70 0.37 0.21 0.48 0.25 0.16
(3.12) (3.55) (1.16) (2.55) (2.01) (3.03) (2.37)
Constant 5.01 4.65 5.16 4.77 4.22 1.61 1.47
(2.76) (2.47) (2.50) (2.52) (2.05) (0.91) (0.79)
Ln Per Capita Income -0.83 -0.85 -0.84 -0.77 -0.75 -0.53 -0.50
(-3.95) (-3.90) (-3.69) (-3.53) (-3.29) (-2.69) (-2.38)
Ln Per Capita State Aid 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.32 0.31
(3.74) (3.26) (3.07) (3.61) (3.23) (4.73) (4.54)
Ln Popu. Prop. with 16+ Yr. Educ. 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.11
(2.30) (2.13) (1.82) (1.89) (1.52) (1.81) (1.45)
Annual Rate Popu. Growth -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03
(-3.20) (-3.84) (-4.57) (-3.34) (-4.39) (-1.68) (-1.89)
Ln Popu. Prop. Afro-American 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.05
(4.64) (4.57) (4.58) (4.59) (4.66) (2.47) (2.42)
Ln Per Cap. Pub. Sec. Earn. 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.14 0.13
(2.89) (2.95) (2.83) (2.71) (2.87) (1.68) (1.52)
Ln Population | | | | | 0.14 0.13
(4.54) (1.52)
Tests of Error Speci¯c.2
LM Breusch-Pagan Heterosked. 1.69 2.04 2.34 2.03 2.28 4.46 4.83
(0.95) (0.92) (0.89) (0.92) (0.89) (0.73) (0.68)
Kiefer-Salmon Normality Test 0.88 0.31 1.06 0.13 0.98 1.58 3.79
(0.64) (0.86) (0.59) (0.93) (0.61) (0.45) (0.15)
LM Test Spat. Error. Depen. 0.37 0.45 1.59 0.00 1.28 3.26 0.86
(0.55) (0.50) (0.21) (0.99) (0.26) (0.07) (0.35)
Robust Tests of Spat. Dep.
LM Test Spat. Lag Depen. 9.06 9.06 5.30 5.42 5.18 12.41 5.98
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
LM Test Spat. Error Depen. 1.32 3.77 3.64 0.11 1.47 6.15 2.34
(0.25) (0.05) (0.06) (0.74) (0.23) (0.01) (0.13)
Common Factor Test
LR Test on Common Factor Hyp. 18.44 20.63 10.25 12.03 18.49 24.20 14.5
(0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
1 Asymptotic standard normal statistics are given in parenthesis.




Ln E®. Total Prop. Tax Rt., 1990 (t) Coe±cient Estimates1
Explanatory Variables: Wcont Wd WP WPcont WP=d
Wt 0.08 -0.60 0.42 0.04 0.20
(0.59) (-0.92) (1.27) (0.35) (0.57)
Constant 0.31 0.37 0.33 0.32 0.29
(0.20) (0.24) (0.22) (0.21) (0.19)
Ln Per Capita Income -0.38 -0.36 -0.38 -0.38 -0.38
(-2.89) (-2.76) (-2.91) (-2.86) (-2.85)
Ln Per Capita State Aid 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
(2.14) (2.18) (2.15) (2.12) (2.11)
Ln Popu. Prop. with 16+ Yr. Educ. 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.62) (0.56) (0.65) (0.58) (0.58)
Annual Rate of Popu. Growth 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.92) (0.72) (0.78) (0.86) (0.82)
Ln Popu. Prop. Afro-American 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(1.47) (1.65) (1.52) (1.51) (1.52)
Ln Lagged Per Capita Levy 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44
(6.32) (5.91) (6.22) (6.26) (6.24)
Tests of Error Speci¯cation2
LM Breusch-Pagan Heterosked. 2.91 3.43 3.54 2.94 3.32
(0.82) (0.75) (0.74) (0.82) (0.77)
Kiefer-Salmon Normality Test 0.80 1.17 0.69 0.81 0.75
(0.67) (0.56) (0.71) (0.67) (0.69)
LM Test of Spat. Error Depen. 0.66 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.00
(0.42) (0.81) (0.75) (0.77) (0.99)
Robust Tests of Spat. Dep.
LM Test of Spat. Lag Depen. 1.27 0.42 3.74 0.28 0.27
(0.26) (0.52) (0.05) (0.60) (0.60)
LM Test of Spat. Error Depen. 1.03 0.19 2.76 0.15 0.17
(0.31) (0.66) (0.10) (0.70) (0.68)
Common Factor Test
LR Test on Common Factor Hyp. 22.57 15.42 4.31 18.42 12.81
(0.001) (0.02) (0.63) (0.005) (0.05)
1 Asymptotic standard normal statistics are given in parenthesis.




Ln E®. Business Prop. Tax Rt., 1990 (t) Coe±cient Estimates1
Explanatory Variables: Wcont WPcont Wcont WPcont
Wt 0.37 0.26 0.34 0.23
(3.53) (2.40) (3.38) (2.29)
Constant 1.68 2.28 -0.27 0.10
(0.55) (0.71) (-0.08) (0.03)
Ln Per Capita Income -0.76 -0.79 -0.63 -0.64
(-2.86) (-2.85) (-2.33) (-2.30)
Ln Per Capita State Aid 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.12
(1.54) (1.24) (1.35) (1.06)
Ln Popu. Prop. with 16+ Yr. Educ. 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03
(0.21) (0.11) (-0.23) (-0.33)
Annual Rate of Popu. Growth -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03
(-0.76) (-1.14) (-0.26) (-0.58)
Ln Popu. Prop. Afro-American 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05
(2.51) (2.62) (1.36) (1.39)
Ln Lagged Per Capita Levy 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.71
(5.43) (5.09) (5.31) (4.98)
Ln Population | | 0.09 0.10
(1.89) (1.99)
Tests of Error Speci¯cation2
LM Breusch-Pagan Heterosked. 5.50 5.57 7.30 7.82
(0.48) (0.47) (0.40) (0.35)
Kiefer-Salmon Normality Test 2.73 3.67 1.67 2.37
(0.25) (0.16) (0.43) (0.31)
LM Test of Spat. Error Depen. 0.01 0.01 0.87 0.33
(0.91) (0.92) (0.35) (0.56)
Robust Tests of Spat. Dep.
LM Test of Spat. Lag Depen. 6.97 3.00 9.33 4.16
(0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.04)
LM Test of Spat. Error Depen. 1.27 0.18 3.28 0.95
(0.26) (0.67) (0.07) (0.33)
Common Factor Test
LR Test on Common Factor Hyp. 10.23 6.71 21.0 10.5
(0.11) (0.35) (0.00) (0.16)
1 Asymptotic standard normal statistics are given in parenthesis.
2 Probability values are given in parenthesis.
26Table 5.
Comparative-Static Exercise For 1980:
Predicted Taxes After 25% Increase
In Cambridge's Per Capita Income1
Predicted Tax Rate
Cities Before After Di®erence
ABINGTON 3.7418 3.7152 -0.0266
ACTON 2.6728 2.6511 -0.0217
ARLINGTON 4.0003 3.9573 -0.0430
BEDFORD 4.6443 4.6051 -0.0392
BELLINGHAM 4.6297 4.5944 -0.0354
BELMONT 3.6196 3.5783 -0.0413
BEVERLY 3.7928 3.7637 -0.0292
BOSTON 9.9856 9.8587 -0.1269
BRAINTREE 3.5970 3.5697 -0.0273
BROCKTON 5.9512 5.9079 -0.0433
BROOKLINE 4.0071 3.9539 -0.0532
BURLINGTON 4.2635 4.2279 -0.0356
CAMBRIDGE 7.3624 6.0481 -1.3143
CANTON 3.9013 3.8713 -0.0300
CHELSEA 7.3981 7.3278 -0.0703
CONCORD 3.5109 3.4820 -0.0289
DANVERS 4.3756 4.3420 -0.0336
DEDHAM 3.4943 3.4649 -0.0294
DUXBURY 3.1729 3.1492 -0.0237
EVERETT 4.6125 4.5646 -0.0479
FOXBOROUGH 4.3404 4.3084 -0.0319
FRAMINGHAM 4.2761 4.2422 -0.0339
FRANKLIN 4.6644 4.6291 -0.0352
HANOVER 4.4345 4.4026 -0.0319
HINGHAM 3.7827 3.7537 -0.0290
HOLBROOK 4.8082 4.7732 -0.0351
LEXINGTON 4.0488 4.0117 -0.0371
LYNN 6.6083 6.5552 -0.0531
LYNNFIELD 2.8188 2.7966 -0.0222
MALDEN 5.0460 4.9973 -0.0487
MARBLEHEAD 3.1871 3.1631 -0.0240
MARSHFIELD 3.4407 3.4153 -0.0254
MEDFIELD 3.6871 3.6589 -0.0282
MEDFORD 5.3279 5.2654 -0.0625
MELROSE 4.2627 4.2250 -0.0376
MILTON 3.6110 3.5804 -0.0306
NATICK 4.4825 4.4466 -0.0358
NEEDHAM 3.6113 3.5804 -0.0309
NEWTON 4.2976 4.2553 -0.0423
27Table 5. - Continued
Predicted Tax Rate
Cities Before After Di®erence
NORTH READING 3.9841 3.9525 -0.0316
NORWOOD 4.0013 3.9709 -0.0304
PEABODY 4.3537 4.3200 -0.0337
PEMBROKE 3.4866 3.4614 -0.0252
QUINCY 4.6568 4.6182 -0.0386
RANDOLPH 4.6835 4.6483 -0.0352
READING 3.7395 3.7093 -0.0302
REVERE 4.3699 4.3305 -0.0395
ROCKLAND 5.1645 5.1277 -0.0368
SALEM 4.6840 4.6489 -0.0351
SAUGUS 3.7390 3.7074 -0.0316
SCITUATE 4.0579 4.0268 -0.0310
SHARON 4.2071 4.1764 -0.0307
SOMERVILLE 6.1793 6.0606 -0.1187
STONEHAM 3.5737 3.5430 -0.0307
STOUGHTON 4.0707 4.0408 -0.0299
SUDBURY 3.3120 3.2854 -0.0266
SWAMPSCOTT 3.5597 3.5315 -0.0282
WAKEFIELD 3.8877 3.8561 -0.0316
WALPOLE 4.2516 4.2199 -0.0317
WALTHAM 4.2648 4.2236 -0.0412
WATERTOWN 4.3300 4.2735 -0.0565
WAYLAND 3.9522 3.9201 -0.0322
WELLESLEY 3.7531 3.7214 -0.0316
WESTON 2.7757 2.7518 -0.0240
WESTWOOD 3.4604 3.4332 -0.0272
WEYMOUTH 4.0783 4.0468 -0.0315
WILMINGTON 4.1139 4.0807 -0.0332
WINCHESTER 3.9546 3.9170 -0.0376
WINTHROP 4.2850 4.2448 -0.0401
WOBURN 4.1140 4.0784 -0.0357
1 The weigth matrix Wd is used in this exercise.
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32Footnotes
¤We thank Dennis Epple, several referees, and seminar participants at several universities for
helpful comments. Any errors or shortcomings in the paper, however, are our responsibility.
1Extensions of the competitive model are found in Braid (1996), Bucovetsky and Wilson
(1991), Hoyt (1991a), Oates and Schwab (1988), Wildasin (1988b), and Wilson (1995).
Extensions of the strategic model are found in Bucovetsky (1995), Burbidge and Myers
(1994), DePater and Myers (1994), Henderson (1994, 1995), Hoyt (1991b, 1992, 1993),
Krelove (1993), Lee (1997), Wildasin (1991), and Wilson (1991, 1997). A precursor to the
entire literature is the study of Kolstad and Wolak (1983).
2Lenon, Chattopadhyay and He²ey (1996) estimate a model of local zoning decisions that is
meant to capture interdependence among jurisidictions. However, their empirical procedures
fail to account for the endogeneity of the choices of competing communities.
3Brueckner (1999) analyzes a Tiebout/tax-competition model assuming competitive, rather
than strategic, behavior.
4Di®erent conclusions emerge in the asymmetric case. Since the low-demand community
ends up as a net importer of capital (see below), it bene¯ts from the lower ½ caused by an
increase in its tax rate. This tendency may lead the community's equilibrium tax rate to
be ine±ciently high. The high-demand community, however, continues to set its tax rate
ine±ciently low. See Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) for further discussion.
5The estimation is handled by the software package SpaceStat (version 1.80), written by
Anselin (1992). By contrast, Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) use instrumental-variables esti-
mation.
6To see how the test is carried out, suppose the true model is the spatial error model, which
consists of (12) and t = Zµ + ². Then, after solving for ², substituting its value in the
previous equation, and some manipulations, we obtain the equivalent model t = ¸Wt +
Zµ ¡ ¸WZµ + ¹, known as the spatial Durbin model. This equation can be rewritten as
t = ¸Wt+Zµ +WZ± +¹, and if the spatial error model is correct, the restriction ± = ¡¸µ
(known as the common factor hypothesis) must be satis¯ed. This restriction can be tested
to indicate whether the spatial error model is appropriate.
7Distances are computed using the latitude and longitude of each city.
338Denoting the total property tax revenues in city i by Ti, the nominal property-tax rate by
tn
i , total assessed property value by Ai, total market property value (\equalized value") by
Vi, the e®ective tax rate is given by ti = Ti=Vi = tn
i Ai=Vi. Data for this calculation are
drawn from the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation (1980, 1981), and Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Department of Revenue (1980).
9Sources are the 1980 and 1990 Census of Population and Housing and the 1982 Census of
Governments.
10For this outcome to occur, housing expenditure (and hence average house value) must increase
less rapidly than the demand for public spending as income rises. With the income elasticity
of housing demand often estimated to be near unity, demand for public spending must then
be income-inelastic.
11Use of a direct poverty measure led to heteroscedastic residuals, which a®ect the e±ciency
of the estimates and bias the coe±cient standard errors. Another variable that was tried
and dropped is the proportion of the population under age 17, which again generated het-
eroscedastic residuals. This youth variable in addition had a signi¯cantly negative coe±cient,
indicating (counterintuitively) that cities with high education needs have low tax rates. We
also experimented with median house value as an explanatory variable, but dropped it be-
cause of potential endogeneity (its coe±cient was also never statistically signi¯cant). Some
speci¯cations included the business share of total property value, but this variable had no
consistent e®ect on tax rates.
12The results are largely unchanged when the public-sector earnings variable is deleted.
13A high community growth rate tends to be associated with a peripheral location in a
metropolitan area, and thus low population density. However, use of population density
in place of the population growth rate led to an equation with heteroscedastic residuals.
14Observe that the Á estimates are uniformly less than unity, as required for (I ¡ ÁW) to
be invertible when W is row-normalized (see Anselin (1988)). Although likelihood values
are not reported, the equations based on the contiguity matrices Wcont and WPcont, which
aggregate tax rates only across communities that share borders with a given jurisdiction,
generate the largest values.
15These needs may involve higher spending for public health, police, etc. The poverty-based
explanation is supported, however, by the fact that a direct poverty measure also had a
positive and signi¯cant coe±cient.
3416Since the city of Boston has by far the highest tax rate in the 1980 sample, we were con-
cerned that the estimated e®ects of the socio-economic variables depended heavily on the
Boston observation. However, when tax rates were regressed on these variables alone (with
the spatial lag variable omitted), the results were similar regardless of whether the Boston
observation was included or deleted.
17Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) also ¯nd a positive population e®ect. In addition, income has
a negative e®ect on the tax rate, as in the present results.
18Note that while the robust test shows the presence of spatial error dependence under the
¯rst weighting scheme, the conditional test is only marginally signi¯cant.
19With population included among the explanatory variables, the experiment described in a
footnote 16 yields the same conclusion as before. In other words, even though Boston is
an outlier both in terms of tax rate and population, an OLS regression of the tax rate on
the above variables yields similar results with and without Boston. Most importantly, the
population coe±cient remains positive when Boston is omitted.
20These gains are calculated by multiplying the increment to the tax base by the previous
year's tax rate. This amount plus 2.5 percent of the original tax base equals the permitted
increase in the levy.
21The levy limit for such cities, which initially equaled 2.5 percent of total property value,
exceeded the actual levy. With the levy limit rising slowly per year, the actual levy eventually
overtook it in most cases.
22Note that a more sophisticated approach would recognize that reaction functions become °at
once they encounter the levy-limit constraint. However, implementing this kind of double-
regime speci¯cation in a spatial lag context appears di±cult.
23The results for the various diagnostic tests are similar to those in Table 2. Also, the results
are una®ected if the growth-rate variable is deleted.
24Business property could not bear more than 150 percent of the burden it would face under
uniform taxes, and residential property could not bear less than 65 percent of the burden it
would face under uniform taxes. See Bradbury (1988).
25This corresponds to an increase from $7957 to $9946.
35